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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
case Prosecutor v. Musema, the trial chamber held that an 
individual can be found guilty solely for the crime of conspiracy to 
commit genocide even if no genocide takes place.1  The trial 
chamber found its jurisdiction to punish the crime of conspiracy 
under its establishing statute, but looks almost exclusively at 
national legal traditions to determine its content.2  It cites no other 
international law supporting its decision to incorporate domestic 
concepts into the crime.  In contrast, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which relatively recently entered into 
                                                 
*
 B.A., Philosophy and Political Science, University of Southern California, 
2006; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2010; LL.M., International and Comparative 
Law, Cornell Law School, 2010.  I am grateful to Professor Jens Ohlin for his 
guidance and encouragement, and James Clegg for helping me flesh out my 
ideas.  Of course I am eternally grateful for my wife who put up with me as I 
completed this piece.  Thank you. 
1
 Prosecutor v. Musema, TJ, ¶194. 
2
 See Id. at ¶¶ 186-191, 196-198, & 939. 
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force, seems to have intentionally dropped the crime of conspiracy 
to commit genocide from its list of crimes under its jurisdiction.3  
This legal and conceptual discord raises the question of whether 
conspiracy is actually a legitimate substantive international crime, 
and whether tribunals should continue to apply it. 
Confusion over the status of conspiracy in international 
criminal law may stem from the interplay between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello.  Conspiracy was most prominently addressed 
during the Nuremburg Trials where it was paired with the crime of 
aggression.4  The crime of aggression falls under jus ad bellum. 
War crimes, like genocide and crimes against humanity, fall under 
the category of jus in bello.  However, the true issue threatening 
the legitimacy of international criminal law is not the confusion of 
what type of law conspiracy should fall under, but whether 
conspiracy should be made a substantive crime at all.  The 
divergent views of the common law and civil law traditions are 
evidence that there the crime is not universal and would be foreign 
to apply one conception to the other.  Not respecting this difference 
would threaten the legitimacy of the entire program. 
This paper will attempt to demonstrate that there is no firm 
foundation in international criminal law to support conspiracy as a 
substantive crime that can stand alone.  In Part II, the problem 
regarding conspiracy as a part of international criminal law will be 
presented, particular through the ICTR cases of Musema and 
Nahimana which will frame the analysis.  Each of those cases 
claimed that a substantive crime of conspiracy existed in 
international law without much discussion of it source or content.  
Next in Part III, a general outline of the concept of inchoate crimes 
will be presented along with some general concepts that are at the 
core of the theory of conspiracy.  Most of the work in this 
discussion will be done in Part IV where possible sources of a 
substantive crime of conspiracy in international criminal law will 
be searched for.  Different sources of international criminal law 
will be presented and possible sources of a substantive crime of 
conspiracy will be highlighted.  Finally, in Part V this paper will 
analyze the most pertinent sources presented in Part IV and assess 
whether a substantive crime of conspiracy actually exists and 
whether such claims as those in the ICTR cases are valid.  The 
ultimate goal of this inquiry is to reveal and critique the muddled 
and haphazard way that courts have applied legal principles to 
international criminal law. 
 
                                                 
3
 See infra Part IV(b)(iii). 
4
 See infra, Part IV(d)(i). 
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II. PROBLEM: IS THERE A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY? 
 
George Fletcher distinguishes three branches of law that are 
associated with conspiracy—two of which have been accepted in 
international law.5  The first branch he calls the “Nuremberg 
version,” which holds that the collective planning, preparing, 
initiating, and waging of aggressive war is a punishable offense 
under international law.6  In the second branch he finds conspiracy 
as a component of the complicity in the commission of a 
substantive crime.7  These two branches of law, conspiracy as 
related to the crime of aggression and as a mode of liability, have 
been accepted in international criminal law.8  With the third branch 
we get to the problem; the third branch is the substantive crime of 
conspiracy as it is found the United States.  Fletcher argues that 
this branch of law has not been adopted in international law.  The 
status of the concept of conspiracy is unclear and was most 
explicitly applied in the ICTR. 
 
a. ICTR Cases 
 
 Alfred Musema, a director of a state-owned tea factory, 
was alleged to have played a crucial role in the Rwandan genocide.  
In Prosecutor v. Musema, an ICTR trial court held that conspiracy 
to commit genocide should be defined as an agreement between a 
group to commit genocide.9  The trial court found that the required 
intent for the substantive crime of conspiracy to commit genocide 
is the same intent required for the crime of genocide, namely the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or 
religious group as such.10 The trial court states, “It emerges from 
this definition that, as far as the crime of conspiracy to commit 
genocide is concerned, it is, indeed, the act of conspiracy itself, in 
other words, the process (“procédé”) of conspiracy, which is 
punishable and not its result.”11  The trial chamber went on to state 
that a crime of conspiracy to commit genocide can stand alone 
even if no genocide took place.12  However, the tribunal noted that 
if the genocide did occur, the individual could not be convicted of 
                                                 
5
 George P. Fletcher, Amicus Curiae Brief Hamdan v. Rumsfeld at 7-9 (2006) 
[hereinafter Fletcher Brief]. 
6
 See infra Part V(d); Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 7-8. 
7
 See infra Part V(d); Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 8. 
8
 Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 7-8. 
9
 Musema, TJ, ¶ 191. 
10
 Id. at ¶192. 
11
 Id. at ¶ 193. 
12
 Id. at ¶ 194. 
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both a conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide itself.13  The 
defendant would simply be convicted of the crime of genocide and 
punishment for conspiring would be consumed by the substantive 
crime. 
 In coming to this conclusion, the Musema trial chamber 
looked to the differences in civil and common law jurisdictions to 
determine the content of the crime of conspiracy to commit 
genocide.14  The court first appropriated the common law actus 
reus elements for conspiracy.15  It then rejected the common law 
principle that a defendant can be convicted of both conspiracy and 
the substantive crime, in favor of the civil law tradition that once 
the object crime is committed then there is no reason to punish the 
defendant for his résolution criminelle or criminal intent.16  This 
cherry picking of doctrines does not follow any rubric and is in 
essence arbitrary.  They cite to no guiding principles in 
international law to legitimize their adoption of various aspects of 
domestic legal systems.  In addition the charge of conspiracy is 
supported by the same set of facts as the object crime of 
genocide.17  Ultimately, the trial chamber found that the prosecutor 
failed show sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit 
genocide.18  It is arguable that the trial chamber’s real reason for 
dismissing the conspiracy charge was because it had enough 
evidence to convict Musema of the substantive crime of 
genocide.19  This reasoning extends into another ICTR case that 
looks to U.S. legal theory to determine the substance of the crime 
of conspiracy. 
 In Nahimana and others, the ICTR trial court expanded on 
the ideas touched on by the Musema court.20  Ferdinand Nahimana 
was a co-founder of the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des 
Mille Collines (RTLM). During the Rawandan genocide, the radio 
station broadcast information and propaganda that was key in the 
coordination and incitement of the killing of Tutsis.  Nahimana 
was convicted for not doing anything by using his influence to stop 
the radio broadcasts.    In the trial court, Nahimana was found 
guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and 
public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and 
                                                 
13
 Id. at ¶ 198. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Id. at ¶ 191. 
16
 Id. at ¶¶ 196-98. 
17
 Id. at ¶ 937. 
18
 Id. at ¶ 940. 
19
 Id. at ¶ 941; see also ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 183 (2008). 
20
 Nahimana and others, AJ, ¶ 1048. 
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crimes against humanity, and he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
The Appeals Chamber reversed the trial court’s conspiracy 
conviction that was based on an inference of an agreement.  It 
reiterates the components of the crime of conspiracy to commit 
genocide as consisting of the existence of an agreement between 
individuals to commit genocide—actus reus, and the intent to 
destroy in whole or in part national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group as such—mens rea.21  The court notes that an agreement can 
be inferred from circumstantial evidence as long as a conspiracy to 
commit genocide is the only reasonable inference that can be made 
based on the evidence.22  “Concerted” and “coordinated” action of 
a group can constitute circumstantial evidence.23  The Appeals 
Chamber specifically looked to U.S. case law in determining 
whether a tacit agreement satisfies the actus reus requirement.24  
The appellate body found that a reasonable trier of fact could not 
have found that, based on the evidence presented, an inference of 
an agreement to commit conspiracy was the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn.25  The ICTR has therefore held that 
conspiracy to commit genocide is a substantive crime that stands 
alone.26  This holding and the content of the holding seem to clash 
with general principles of international criminal law. 
 
III. INCHOATE CRIME THEORY AND CONSPIRACY 
 
 A substantive crime of conspiracy is considered to be an 
inchoate crime.  An inchoate crime is especially an incomplete 
crime, i.e. a crime committed in the course of perpetrating or 
planning another crime.27  This other, “failed” crime is called the 
object crime of the conspiracy.  The rationale behind criminalizing 
inchoate crimes is the idea that the acts leading up to a crime were 
steps taken in an effort to do something illegal, regardless of 
whether the perpetrator was caught before the actual crime was 
committed or not.  The seemingly benign acts are not actually so 
innocent.  There is thus a hope that criminalizing the acts leading 
up to a crime will have a deterrence effect on society as a whole.28     
                                                 
21
 Id. at ¶ 894. 
22
 Id. at ¶ 896. 
23
 Id. at ¶ 897. 
24
 Id. at ¶ 898 (citing Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975)). 
25
 Id. at ¶ 912. 
26
 Musema, TJ, ¶ 194; Nahimana and others, AJ, ¶ 1044. 
27
 DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, AND DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 188 (2010). 
28
 See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975). 
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 Conspiracy is inherently a group crime requiring collective 
action.  The basis of the crime is the agreement by a group to 
commit a crime.29  The mens rea element of the crimes requires 
that each member of the conspiracy must have knowledge of the 
facts making up the crime the group intends to commit and the 
intent to carry out the plan.30  The crime is almost exclusively 
found in common law legal systems.  Civil law systems shy away 
from these types of inchoate crimes. 
 
IV. IF IT EXISTED, WHAT IS ITS SOURCE? 
 
 The sources of international law, and similarly international 
criminal law, have been listed in Article 38 of the 1945 Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.  The list provides for four main 
sources of international law: international custom; international 
conventions and treaties; general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”31  The 
resolutions of international organizations like the Security Council 
are also form a part of international law.  Treaty law and 
customary law are thought to be of equal validity in that new 
custom can supersede old treaties, and new treaties can supersede 
existing custom.  In addition, both function as a source for the 
other, e.g. treaty law can “codify” pre-existing custom or give rise 
to new customary norms.  An example of the interplay between 
treaty law and custom is the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which clarified and crystallized existing customary law.  
When a treaty’s provisions are regarded as a part of customary law, 
those provisions are generally applicable to non-parties to the 
treaty.  Here, this paper will explore the different sources of 
international law for a foundation for a substantive crime of 
conspiracy. 
 
a. Customary International Law 
 
  Simply, customary international law is formed by 
consistent state practice combined with opinio juris or a sense of 
legal obligation that the consistent state practice is required.  State 
practice is found by looking to the practice of the international 
community and assessing whether there is sufficient consistency, 
although absolute uniformity is not necessary.  The practices of the 
states most likely to be affected are the most relevant.  The 
                                                 
29
 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 227 (2d ed. 2008). 
30
 Id. 
31
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (1946). 
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relevant state practice must be carried out as being required by a 
legal obligation.32  Evidence of a sense of legal obligation can be 
found in the negative response by the international community to 
deviations in state practice.  The strongest form of international 
law is a form of customary law called jus cogens.  Jus cogens is a 
preemptory norm that supersedes all other sources of international 
law and binds all states regardless of objection.33  Most of the main 
international crimes, e.g. crime of aggressive war, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide, make up jus cogens, as well as 
prohibitions on apartheid, slavery, and torture. 
 The most prominent source of international criminal law is 
the law of war.  The law of war pre-dates World War II and was 
primarily made up of customary law.  It has slowly been codified 
by a series of conventions and treaties that crystallize is provisions.  
There does not seem to be any custom in the international realm 
for holding an individual liable for the substantive crime of 
conspiracy.  Individuals were not generally held liable under 
international law until very recently; international law primarily 
dealt with states.  Thus, the customary law of war most likely did 
not have any provision for conspiracy at the international criminal 
level.  Other sources that evidence customary law are United 
Nations General Assembly Resolutions.  These resolutions often 
evidence opinio juris that can be coupled with state practice.  
There is a resolution in particular that “codifies” the principles in 
the Nuremberg trials, which is discussed below.34  The resolution 
may evidence custom, but it is particularly narrow and may not 
comport with state practice as between civil and common-law 
countries. 
 
b. Treaty Law 
 
 Treaty law serves as an explicit source of international law 
and functions much like either a contract or legislation.  Treaty law 
is a major source of obligations and rights and is often the most 
explicit and clear form of international law.  There are a number of 
treaty regimes and conventions that specifically deal with 
international criminal law and the role of conspiracy within that 
law.  The following are a few of the most relevant treaty regimes 
that address or might address the concept of conspiracy in 
international law. 
                                                 
32
 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v 
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) ICJ Reports 4 at 44 
(1969). 
33
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 art. 53 
(1969). 
34
 See infra Part IV(d)(i). 
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i. Laws of War 
 
The laws of war are primarily composed of a number of 
multi-lateral treaties.  The two main treaties regimes are the 
Geneva and the Hague Conventions.  The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions do not refer to conspiracy as a crime in its 
contemplation of having individual states enforcing the “grave 
breaches” through domestic proceedings.35  Therefore, as 
mentioned above the laws of war do not explicitly contain a 
substantive crime.36 
 
ii. Genocide Convention 
 
The Genocide Convention is the convention or treaty with 
most prominent use of conspiracy as a substantive crime.  The 
Genocide Convention includes the charge of conspiracy as a direct 
response to Nazis Germany’s actions against the Jewish 
population.  Article 3 of the Convention states: 
 
The following acts shall be 
punishable: 
(a) Genocide; 
(b) Conspiracy to commit 
genocide; 
(c) Direct and public 
incitement to commit 
genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit 
genocide; 
(e) Complicity in genocide.37 
 
 The Convention makes explicit the crime of conspiracy to 
commit genocide and this explicit proclamation is a direct result of 
the drafters’ abhorrence for genocide and desire to criminalize 
even the planning a genocide.  Many of the provision in the 
Genocide Convention have become a part of customary law, and it 
is possible that article 3 cited above has become a part of 
customary law since it has been adopted in the statutes establishing 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
                                                 
35
 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(Aug. 12, 1949) art. 129-30, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention]. 
36
 See infra Part IV(a). 
37
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
(Dec. 9, 1948) art. 3 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Genocide Convention). 
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(ICTY) and the ICTR—although it was not adopted in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).38 
 
iii. Statutes Establishing the International Tribunals and 
Courts 
 
The various statutes that establish the ad hoc tribunals and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) are also a place to look for 
the concept of conspiracy as a substantive crime.  These statutes 
were either created through Security Council resolutions or 
through the multi-lateral treaty process, and are based on existing 
international law. 
The 1945 London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal is the statute that gives the Nuremberg tribunal 
jurisdiction over various crimes that include a conspiracy 
component.  Article 6 of the London Charter provided the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal and enumerated crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity as acts falling within the 
jurisdiction of the court.39  Article 6 goes on to state: “Leaders, 
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”40 The 
purpose of this phrase was to allow the tribunal to reach back to 
pre-war acts committed against German Jews in the years from 
1933 to 1939. 
This type of conspiracy principle was inserted by U.S. 
lawyer Murray Bernays who thought that the entire Nazis party 
should be treated as a gang of criminals who seized the 
government in Germany and used the power of the state as a tool 
to carry out their illegitimate ends.  Both French and Russia 
delegates at the London debates disagreed with the concept 
because the civil law countries do not have a similar concept.  
They were particularly abhorred by the fact that each individual 
would be responsible for all acts committed by the group simply 
through an agreement and nothing else.  This extended form of 
liability would mean that one lowly Nazis guard would be 
responsible for millions of murders.      
Later, both major ad hoc tribunals established in the 1990s 
would have the crime of conspiracy incorporated into their 
jurisdiction under the crime of genocide. The statutes establishing 
these tribunals and courts include jurisdiction over violations of the 
                                                 
38
 CASSESE supra note 29, at 228. 
39
 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279, 284, art. 6. [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] 
40
 Id. 
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law of war.  The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia states that “conspiracy to commit genocide” 
is a crime within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.41  The Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda provides for the same 
exact crime42—both being derived from the Genocide 
Convention.43  The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
establishing a court to try individuals for war crimes who involved 
in the Sierra Leone Civil War, provides that “[a] person who 
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime 
referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.”44  Crimes falling under that 
court’s jurisdiction include crimes against humanity45 and 
violations of the Geneva Conventions;46 however, the statute does 
not provide for jurisdiction over the crime of genocide or 
conspiracy to commit genocide explicitly.     
The Rome Statute,47 which establishes the International 
Criminal Court, adopted every part of the Genocide Convention, 
except for the part regarding conspiracy.48  Article 6 of the Rome 
Statute eliminates the conspiracy prong of the crime of genocide: 
 
For the purpose of this 
Statute, “genocide” means any of the 
following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: 
(a)  Killing members of the 
group; 
(b)  Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c)  Deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life 
                                                 
41
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (May 
25, 1993), art. 4(3)(b) 32 I.L.M. 1192 (ICTY Statute). 
42
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Nov. 8, 1994), art. 
2(3)(b) 33 I.L.M. 1598 (ICTR Statute). 
43
 See supra Part IV(b)(ii). 
44
 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, (Jan. 16, 2002) art. 6(1) (SCLC 
Statute). 
45
 Id. at art. 2. 
46
 Id. at art. 3. 
47
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998) 37 I.L.M. 
999 (Rome Statute). 
48
 Antonio Cassese, Genocide in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 335, 347 (eds. Cassese, Gaeta & Jones, 
2002). 
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calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d)  Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e)  Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another 
group.49 
 
This omission is likely a signal that the drafters did not 
think it prudent to include conspiracy.  The signal may be pointing 
to the fact the drafters did and do not consider a substantive crime 
of conspiracy as being a part of international criminal law.  This 
recent omission in the creation of a new legal regime raises the 
issue to a new level. 
 
c. General Principles of Law: Domestic Law 
 
Courts can use general principles of law to fill gaps in 
international law that will help make sense of the entire legal 
schema.  General principles of law carry less weighted and are 
quite controversial in international law because of their uncertain 
states.  There is a strong preference for treaty and customary law 
because they are thought to better capture the spirit of the law most 
consented to by most nations.  If international law, though treaties 
or custom, fails to provide an appropriate standard or guide for a 
court, then a court may look to the domestic legal systems for 
guidance in determining appropriate standards.  In the case of 
international conspiracy, there has been much focus on the 
domestic approaches to conspiracy, especially the differences 
between the common and civil law traditions. 
Many international courts and commentators look to the 
United States’ legal system for guidance or a reference point.  In 
the United States, conspiracy is a substantive crime in addition to 
being a mode of liability.50  The United States federal code in, 18 
U.S.C. §371, provides for three basic elements for the crime of 
conspiracy.  There are other conspiracy statutes in the federal 
code,51 but this one best outlines the main elements.  These 
elements include; an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective 
                                                 
49
 Rome Statute, art 6. 
50
 See Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 118-19 (2005). 
51
 See 21 U.S.C. §§846 and 963.  “Any person who attempts or conspires to 
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same 
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the 
object of the attempt or conspiracy.”  Id. 
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must exist, the defendant must knowingly and voluntarily 
participate in the conspiracy, and the there needs to be an overt act 
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.52  However, many 
statutes, both federal and state, and the common law omit the overt 
act requirement.53  The first element is usually considered the 
plurality requirement and the third element, the overt act 
requirement.  It is this third requirement that distinguishes the 
crime of conspiracy from the mere discussion of a crime under 
federal law.  It is taking the thoughts and putting them into action.  
That simple act condemns the whole group, even if others in the 
conspiracy do nothing.  To avoid liability, a conspirator must take 
active steps to get out of the conspiracy, but that may not be 
enough.  If the group succeeds in committing the object crime, 
they can still be charged with conspiracy as a substantive crime in 
addition to being charged with the object crime.54  Thus, 
conspiracy does not combine with the object crime to create one 
substantive crime, but remains its own crime. 
As a mode of liability, conspiracy can be used to convict a 
defendant for the substantive crimes of the defendant’s co-
conspirators.  Shortly after the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter, 
the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated conspiracy as a mode of 
liability into federal criminal law.  Pinkerton v. United States55 
held that each conspirator is responsible for all reasonably 
foreseeable crimes committed by the group in the furtherance of 
the conspiracy.  This form of responsibly is known as “Pinkerton 
Liability.”  Under Pinkerton liability, a large conspiracy with many 
acts going on in different places can produce a large number of 
crimes that an individual is liable for.  Prosecutors in the U.S. use 
conspiracy as a powerful weapon to leverage and convict 
defendants in criminal organizations, providing many substantive 
and procedural advantages.56 Pinkerton liability is very broad and 
captures all the members of the conspiracy without differentiating 
the level of participation in the furtherance of the plan.  Pinkerton 
liability is not a part of many U.S. state jurisdictions, the Model 
Penal Code, and civil law jurisdictions.57  The third category of the 
joint criminal enterprise doctrine is similar to this form of liability, 
but a wholly separate mode of liability.58  The doctrine of joint 
                                                 
52
 United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986). 
53
 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§846 and 963 
54
 Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). 
55
 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). 
56
 See LUBAN, ET AL. supra note 27, at 519 for a list of advantages conspiracy 
provides for federal prosecutors in the U.S. 
57
 LUBAN, ET AL. supra note 27, at 880. 
58
 See Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he international doctrine of ‘joint 
criminal enterprise,’ [. . .] has nothing to do with crime of conspiratorial 
agreement.”). 
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criminal enterprise is different from Pinkerton liability in that it 
does not impose automatically, and generally apply, liability to all 
members of the group.59  It requires a case-by-case analysis of the 
participation of each member of the group.60 
The civil law tradition, especially in continental Europe, 
does not include the substantive crime of conspiracy.  An 
illustrative example of a civil law approach is the 1930 Italian 
Penal Code that states, “So far as the law does not provide to the 
contrary, if two or more persons agree to commit a criminal act 
and the act is not committed, no one may be punished for the 
simple fact of the agreement.”61  The Musema court claimed to 
have found a comparable concept to conspiracy called complot in 
the civil law tradition; however, this claim seems dubious.62  It is 
well settled that civil law systems do not favor an inchoate crimes 
like the Anglo-American style conspiracy doctrine. 
 
d. Judicial Decisions 
 
Judicial decisions can also be a source for international law, 
although they are somewhat secondary to both custom and treaty 
law.  For instance, the Statute for the International Court of Justice 
states that the Court’s decisions do not have precedential effect.63  
Judicial law at the international level most closely reflects a civil 
law tradition, rather than a common law tradition with precedent.  
International courts and tribunals have limited jurisdiction as 
defined in their founding charters or statutes.  They are generally 
considered to be lacking the power to create new law to fill gaps in 
international law—although using the various sources of 
international law creatively would allow a court to deal with 
ambiguities.  Only the most relevant international court decisions 
pertaining to the law of criminal conspiracy are presented here. 
 
i. International Military Tribunals 
 
In United States v. Goering the defendants were charged 
with “Crimes against Peace by the planning, preparation, initiation 
and waging of wars of aggression” and “War Crimes” and “Crimes 
against Humanity,” as well as “participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit all these 
                                                 
59
 Id. at 21-22. 
60
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61
 Italian Penal Code § 115 (1930). 
62
 See infra Part V. 
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 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59 (1946). 
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crimes.”64  The court’s analysis contains references to both 
“conspiracy” and “common plan” to commit war crimes.  The 
evidence presented by the prosecution was offered to support the 
charges of both conspiring and the common plan, as well as the 
charges of planning and waging war.65  The scope of the 
conspiracy in this case spanned twenty-five years, beginning with 
the formation of the Nazis party—creating a huge class of possible 
defendants.66  The court quotes the prosecution that states “any 
significant participation in the affairs of the Nazi Party or 
Government is evidence of a participation in a conspiracy that is in 
itself criminal.”67  It uses this expansive definition of the 
conspiracy to levy liability on a wide group of individuals and to 
deal with the problem of organizational responsibility.68  
Nonetheless, the court notes that the only substantive crime of 
conspiracy is that related to the crime of aggressive war.69  Here, 
the defendants were charged with the crime of conspiracy even 
though the substantive crime, i.e. aggression, had occurred.  This 
trial was not a case of a failed attempt at starting an illegal war 
where conspiracy stood alone. 
The substantive law of Nuremberg was not considered 
genuine international crimes until 1950 when the U.N. General 
Assembly declared them to be universal principles of international 
law.70  The only mention of conspiracy in the 1950 U.N. 
Nuremberg principles is the mention in relation to “crimes against 
peace:” 
 
(a) Crimes against peace: 
(i) Planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or 
assurances;  
(ii) Participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the acts 
mentioned under (i).71 
                                                 
64
 United States v. Goering (Sept. 30 1946) IMT, § 411 available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/09-30-46.asp. 
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 Id. at § 466. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 366 (1994). 
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 Goering supra note 64, at § 468. 
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 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and Judgment of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess. Supp. No. 12, 
U.N. Doc. A/1316 (July 29, 1950). 
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 Id. at Principle VI(a). 
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 Here the mention of conspiracy is probably as a mode of 
liability to the crime of aggression, not as a substantive crime on 
its own.  No mention of conspiracy is found under later subsections 
outlining war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
 The form of liability that has arisen out of the IMT refers to 
the collective planning, preparing, initiating, and waging of 
aggressive war.72  George Fletcher analyzes the inclusion of 
conspiracy in the IMT as it applies to the crime of aggression as 
not adding anything to the substance of the crime.73  He states that 
the crime of aggression is inherently a crime of collective action—
an inherent conspiracy.74  Conspiracy is not doing any of the work 
in the description and it is a redundant charge.  Therefore, the 
substantive crime of conspiracy to commit a crime of aggression is 
only criminalized if the crime of aggression does not happen.  
Once the plan comes to fruition the crime of aggression absorbs 
the crime of conspiracy.75 
 In the Tokyo Tribunal, the court found one defendant, 
foreign minister Shigemitsu, guilty of the crime of aggression, but 
acquitting him of conspiracy.76  In another case, the tribunal found 
defendant ambassador Shiratori guilty of conspiracy and acquitted 
him of the crime of aggression.77  The convictions were also tried 
in the context of a successful commencement of a war of 
aggression. 
 
ii. Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
As described above in Part II, the ICTR in the Muesma and 
Nahimana and others cases have addressed the issue of criminal 
conspiracy as it pertains to the crime of genocide.78  Another ICTR 
case where the concept of conspiracy was employed in the 
Kambanda case, where the same trial chamber as the one that 
heard the Musema case held that the defendant was guilty, after 
temporarily pleading guilty, of both genocide and conspiracy to 
commit genocide.79  Jean Kambanda was the interim Prime 
Minister of Rwanda, and was accused of distributing weapons with 
the knowledge that they would be used in genocide.  A similar 
result was reached in the Niyitegeka case where the defendant, 
                                                 
72
 Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 8. 
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 Id. at 14. 
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 Id. 
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 CASSESE supra note 29, at 161 & 228. 
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 Id. at 161. 
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78
 See supra Part II. 
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Minister of Information in the Interim Government and participant 
in attacks on Tutsi refugees, was found guilty of both crimes.80 
The ICTY has and is currently trying defendants for 
conspiracy to commit genocide.  For instance Zdravko Tolimir, 
Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bosnian 
Serb Army, is currently being tried for inter alia genocide and 
conspiracy to commit genocide for events that took place in 
Srebrenica.81 In addition, the trial chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Popović et al. is expected to render judgment on June 10, 2010, 
where four defendants are charged with inter alia genocide and 
conspiracy to commit genocide.82  The charges allege that the men 
entered an agreement with others with the intent to kill and cause 
physical and mental harm to Muslims in Srebrenica, with the 
purpose to destroy, in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
group, as such.83  The plan came to fruition in the Srebrenica 
Massacre which did actually take place in July 1995, resulting in 
thousands of deaths and the displacement of thousands refugees.84   
The court’s analysis of the conspiracy charge will provide useful 
insight into its status in international criminal law. 
Conspiracy has most often been used in the ad hoc 
tribunals as part of the conceptual development of a mode of 
liability in international criminal law.  The Anglo-American 
concepts of conspiracy have been incorporated into the ICTY and 
ICTR and have been blended with the civilian doctrines of 
accomplice liability to create the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise.85  The ICTY has discussed conspiracy as a mode of 
liability in comparison to joint criminal liability, for example in the 
Milutinović case where Dragoljub Ojdanić challenged the court’s 
jurisdiction.  The ICTY emphasizes that the two modes of liability 
are very different, stating: “while mere agreement is sufficient in 
the case of conspiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal 
enterprise will depend on the commission of criminal acts in 
furtherance of that enterprise.”86 Ojdanić was charged both as a 
superior87 and for planning, instigating, ordering, committing and 
otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or 
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 Niyitegeka, TJ, ¶¶ 459, 480, 502. 
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 Zdravki Tolimir, Case information Sheet, “Srebrenica” (IT-05-88/2) available 
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execution of those crimes.88  Most of the ICTY cases address 
conspiracy as a mode of liability.  The pending cases described 
above should be enlightening as to how this court treats conspiracy 
as a substantive crime. 
 
iii. Juridic Writings 
 
As a side note to the actual law described above, certain 
writings and draft laws may be helpful in interpreting the current 
state of international criminal law.  The International Law 
Commission is charged with the “promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.”89  The 
United Nations General Assembly established the Commission in 
1948.   The Commission has created a number of treaty regimes, 
including the Vienna Conventions, as well as creating the Rome 
Statute establishing the ICC.  Article 2 of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes states: “An individual shall 
be responsible for a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 if that 
individual: [. . .] [d]irectly participates in planning or conspiring to 
commit such a crime which in fact occurs.”90  In this formulation, 
conspiracy is only punishable if the object crime “in fact occurs.”  
This would preclude conspiracy from being an inchoate crime that 
can stand alone; however, it seems to comport with the practice of 
past international courts. 
 
V. ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION 
 
 The use of conspiracy as an inchoate crime has varied over 
the decades and in the variously constituted courts; however, any 
use in international criminal law was likely impermissible and was 
a misapplication of the concept.  Through surveying the various 
sources of the inchoate crime of conspiracy, it is clear that the 
theory is convoluted and there is much ambiguity as to its status.  
One main source of confusion is the conflation of conspiracy as a 
substantive crime and conspiracy as a mode of liability.  As stated 
earlier, conspiracy as a mode of liability is most likely a part of 
criminal law.  In those cases, the object crime must have been 
committed for liability to flow to the defendant.  Nonetheless, a 
substantive crime of conspiracy most likely is not a part of 
international criminal law, or to the extent it is used by 
international tribunals, it is a misapplied and the tribunals are 
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acting ultra vires.  Some commentators seem to think that the 
principles of conspiracy law are not existent in international law 
altogether.91   The disconnect between decisions in the ICTR and 
the Rome Statute omitting conspiracy from it’s jurisdiction, 
suggest that this problem had not been resolved and may persist 
into the future. 
 Examining the possible sources of a substantive crime of 
conspiracy produces various rationales for why there is no 
substantive crime of conspiracy in international criminal law.  The 
first being the scarceness of the concept in international treaty law 
and in the statutes establishing the international courts and 
tribunals.  Although many of the statutes establishing the 
international tribunals provide for a crime of conspiracy as related 
to a particularly heinous object crime, e.g. genocide and 
aggression, these principles are not given any substance by the 
statutes and the charge is rarely levied in cases where the object 
crime did not occur.  In addition, the trend seems to be to move 
away from having a substantive crime of conspiracy in the statutes 
as is the case with the Rome Statute.  Further, the crime of 
conspiracy is not likely a part of customary law because of the 
inconsistency of practice given the divergent positions of the civil 
and common law legal systems.  Applying a principle that is 
rejected by most legal systems around the world seems to be unfair 
and violate the principle of non crimen sine lege. 
 The IMT seems to be the most prominent source for finding 
conspiracy in international law.  However, as pointed out by 
commentators, the London Agreement of 1945 was created after 
the crimes had been committed.92  Thus any conviction of a 
conspiracy was used in the context of completed substantive 
crimes.  No defendant in the Nuremberg IMT was convicted of 
conspiracy as a sole substantive crime.93  This is a common trend 
in international criminal law.  The use of conspiracy at Nuremberg 
was more for “shock value and [a] moral message.”94 
 The Tokyo Tribunals and the ICTR seem to be the only to 
courts to recognize the conspiracy as a substantive offense that can 
stand alone from the object crime.  Although the Genocide 
Convention provides for a substantive crime of conspiracy, and the 
main tribunals have jurisdiction to try this crime, actually applying 
the principle may be a mistake.  The content and substance of the 
crime is unclear and requires the courts to reach beyond 
established international law to attempt to deal with the foreign 
concept.  In particular, the ICTR case law poses a number of 
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problems in applying the principle of conspiracy as a substantive 
crime. 
In the midst of trying to determine the content of the crime 
of conspiracy the court engaged in questionable reasoning.  First, 
the Musema court also strangely said it would adopt “the definition 
of conspiracy most favorable to Musema.”95  Why would a court 
do this?  What principle of law were they applying here?  This 
seems arbitrary and has no clear basis in settled international law.  
In doing so, the Musema trial chamber conflated different concepts 
from common and civil law traditions.  It purported to find 
common law concepts of conspiracy within the civil law 
tradition.96  It claimed that the concept of complot as it exists in the 
civil law tradition is similar to the common law concept of 
conspiracy.97  Complot is punishable with regard to extremely 
serious crimes like threatening state security.98  The court 
presumably only seemed to be citing to French law.99  
Commentators of the court criticize its lack of citations to sources 
of the civil law concepts that it uses.100  In addition the court has 
not been consistent in applying the principle.  There is a conflict 
between the Musema court stating that an individual cannot be 
convicted of both conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide, 
and the Kambanda court that found a defendant guilty of both 
conspiracy and the object crime.  This disconnect highlights the 
haphazard nature of the ICTR’s rulings. 
The ICTY so far has resorted to the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise not an American style conspiracy charge in its 
cases; however, it will be interesting to see how the ICTY deals 
with the conspiracy charges in its pending cases. The doctrine of 
joint criminal enterprise seems better equipped to be employed by 
international courts and tribunals to extend liability.  The doctrine 
incorporated elements of conspiracy into its definition.  
Involvement in a “common plan” under the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise is much broader than the mode of liability of 
conspiracy.  
The United States Supreme Court has weighed in on 
whether there is an international substantive crime of conspiracy, 
particularly looking to the laws of war.  The laws of war are the 
precursors to international criminal law and it is pertinent to 
discover whether the foundational principles of international 
criminal law contain such a substantive crime.  In an amicus curiae 
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brief filed in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld101 case, George Fletcher 
argued that the laws of war do not include the substantive crime of 
conspiracy.102  In that case, the defendant Hamdan was charged 
with conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism in a military 
commission.  The commissions only have jurisdiction under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for offences established 
by statute or by the law of war.103  Since Congress had not granted 
military commission to try cases of conspiracy, the only head of 
jurisdiction available to the commissions would be the laws of war.  
Fletcher then goes through the development of the laws of war 
since the IMT and comes to the conclusion that the substantive 
crime of conspiracy is not a part of it.  Fletcher claims that the 
substantive crime of conspiracy is neither found in international 
customary law or in treaty law governing the laws of war, 
especially pointing to the Geneva and Hague Conventions.104   
Justice Stevens writing for a plurality agrees with Fletcher and 
finds, through statute and common law, that conspiracy is not apart 
of the law of war, and thus the military commissions do not have 
jurisdiction to try Hamdan.105  Nevertheless, the outcome of the 
case did not turn on this fact because Justice Kennedy did not join 
this part of Stevens’s opinion, which made it a plurality.106  George 
Fletcher describes the references to conspiracy in the Genocide 
Convention and the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR as “the 
afterglow of a dying concept.”107 
The divergence in the approaches of the common law and 
the civil law systems creates a major problem in adopting 
conspiracy as a substantive crime, regardless of whether the 
contours of the crime are clearly defined.  It is true that in most 
common law legal systems, the substantive crime of conspiracy 
exists; therefore, a group of individuals is guilty of a substantive 
offense as soon as they agree to commit a criminal act.108 
However, George Fletcher puts it simply, “[C]onspiracy is foreign 
to every legal system outside the English-speaking world.”109  
Civil law countries use other legal devices to accomplish the same 
goals as the common law states do with the concept of 
conspiracy.110  Civil law, or civil law-like, countries constitute a 
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substantial part of the world’s legal systems. Most of South 
America, Africa, Asia, and almost all of Europe have civil law 
systems, including Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Germany.  
The common law is primarily limited to English-speaking 
world.111   This disparity should counsel against the adoption of a 
minority principle into international criminal law. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
After examining the jumble of sources for the concept of 
the substantive crime of conspiracy in international law, we have 
seen that the overlapping and sometimes contradictory norms 
create great confusion that is often exacerbated by the international 
courts and tribunals.  Because it has been demonstrated that the 
existence of a substantive crime of conspiracy in international 
criminal law is dubious, and most likely wrong, courts should not 
employ it in their reasoning.  This area is continuing to develop 
and the move taken by in the Rome Statute of removing the crime 
of conspiracy from its jurisdiction is a step in the right direction.  
International criminal law should best comport with the legal 
concepts that a majority of the world would expect to be bound 
under to remain a legitimate legal system. 
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